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SOUNDINGS AND SILENCES 
Laurence H. Tribe* 
INTRODUCTION 
It was 1964. I was in my second year of law school when Simon and 
Garfunkel released the early version of their first and maybe greatest musical 
masterpiece, “The Sounds of Silence,” a commercial failure that temporarily 
broke the duo apart until the piece was remixed in 1965 and re-released in 
1966.1 As revised, it has had a lasting legacy as art. And it quickly became my 
favorite song from the 1960s. As the song’s own lyrics put it, 
a vision softly creeping 
Left its seeds while I was sleeping 
And the vision that was planted in my brain 
Still remains 
Within the sound of silence.2 
I still recall how those lyrics echoed in my mind during a class I was 
taking in the Fall of 1965 called Advanced Constitutional Law taught by the 
former Solicitor General and Watergate Special Prosecutor, Professor 
Archibald Cox. The professor came into the classroom carrying the slip 
opinion the Supreme Court had released that June in the now-famous case 
of Griswold v. Connecticut, which held that a married couple’s use of 
contraceptives to enjoy sex without risking pregnancy could not be made a 
crime.3 The right of reproductive freedom, later extended to unmarried 
individuals4 and eventually extended from contraception to abortion,5 
hadn’t been mentioned in the Constitution. But the Court’s majority had 
 
 * Carl M. Loeb University Professor and Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard 
Law School. I am grateful to my colleague, Vicki Jackson, for her helpful comments on a 
previous draft of this essay. I would also like to thank Colin Doyle, Cary Glynn, Alexander 
Loomis, and Alice Wang for their outstanding editing and research assistance. 
 1. Geoffrey Himes, How “The Sound of Silence” Became a Surprise Hit, SMITHSONIAN, 
(Jan. 2016), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/sound-silence-surprise-hit-
180957672/?no-ist [https://perma.cc/LEZ3-LTF7]. 
 2. SIMON AND GARFUNKEL, The Sounds of Silence, on WEDNESDAY MORNING, 3 A.M. 
(Columbia Records 1964). 
 3. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 4. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454–55 (1972). 
 5. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165–66 (1973). 
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concluded it was there just the same: the Constitution’s silence on the subject 
wasn’t to be construed as denying constitutional protection to “a right of 
privacy older than the Bill of Rights.”6 
I didn’t know it at the time, but that same vision would come to 
structure much of what I learned and have since taught about the law. 
During my clerkship for Justice Potter Stewart in 1967–68, for example, I 
was proud to have had an opportunity to play a role in the Supreme Court’s 
holding, in a case called Katz v. United States,7 that electronically 
eavesdropping on phone conversations that someone expected would not be 
overheard by Big Brother constituted a “search or seizure” within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment’s ban on “unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”8 The Court’s justification for this landmark holding was that, 
although government agents had not physically trespassed on or into any 
property occupied by the person on whom it was spying, the Constitution 
“protects people, not places,”9 and the government’s electronic overhearing 
and recording of the defendant’s conversations conflicted with his justifiable 
“expectation of privacy.”10 
The Fourth Amendment, as Justice Hugo Black insisted in dissent, was 
silent with respect to eavesdropping, whether by private citizens or by 
government agents.11 And the Framers had certainly been well aware of the 
practice of government eavesdropping when the Bill of Rights was drafted in 
1789 and ratified in 179112 (although they of course had no idea that 
electronic eavesdropping might someday be possible). Moreover, as Justice 
Black emphasized, the entire Constitution was silent with respect to a right of 
“privacy.”13 The majority’s response, in the opinion I helped draft, was that 
implicit in the Constitution was a right to expect that certain conversations 
would indeed remain private, even if the government made it known that it 
might be listening in. To reach that conclusion, the majority necessarily 
 
 6. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486. 
 7. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 8. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 369. Almost forty years earlier, the Court had handed down 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in part by Katz, 389 U.S. at 352–53, 
which held that the government could violate the Fourth Amendment only by trespassing on 
people’s property. In Katz, the Court was going to vote 4-4 (with Justice Marshall recusing 
himself) to leave standing the decision below, which had relied on Olmstead, but the 
arguments I made helped persuade Justice Stewart to adopt changed the result to a 7-1 ruling 
in the other direction. Stephen Reinhardt, Tribute to Professor Laurence Tribe, 42 TULSA L. 
REV. 939, 940–41 (2007). 
 9. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
 10. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 11. See id. at 365–66 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 12. Id. at 366 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 13. Id. at 373–74 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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looked outside the four corners of the Fourth Amendment’s text to 
formulate what it deemed a tacit postulate of the freedom of expression, a 
freedom expressly protected by the First Amendment. As the Court saw it, 
the system of free expression could not survive the chilling effect that would 
result from requiring all phone users to assume that they might be 
broadcasting their words to the uninvited ears of the FBI just because they 
hadn’t taken measures to block out the uninvited eyes of passersby.14 The 
fact that the defendant in Katz made his call from inside a glass telephone 
booth was not dispositive of his right to informational privacy against the 
government.15 
It would be a stretch to attribute that treatment of the Constitution’s 
silence with respect to informational privacy to the song Paul Simon had 
written a few years earlier. But that song played in my mind’s eye, and I must 
say that Justice Stewart was a Simon and Garfunkel fan as well. 
Flash forward a dozen years or so to the first edition of the treatise I 
published in 1978, entitled American Constitutional Law.16 That book’s final 
chapter, entitled “The Problem of State Action,” grappled with one of the 
most perplexing aspects in the law of the U.S. Constitution: its character as a 
body of law addressing not ordinary private conduct but only government 
conduct.17 Because government is responsible not only for the discrete acts of 
public officials and agents acting on its authority but also for the body of 
laws and rules promulgated by government, it follows that the law of the 
Constitution is a kind of meta-law.18 Among its rules are some that address 
the things that government actors have an affirmative constitutional 
obligation to do, so that many instances of what might be regarded as 
government inaction pose troubling constitutional questions.19 
But to prevent the Constitution from becoming just another ordinary 
law—and to create breathing space for choices that government is either 
constitutionally obliged or at least free to permit or prohibit as it sees fit—the 
 
 14. Id. at 352. 
 15. Id. 
 16. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1st ed. 1978). 
 17. Id. at 1147. 
 18. See Laurence H. Tribe, Essay, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers 
Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, (1989). 
 19. See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 766–68 (2005) (holding that 
a woman did not have a property interest under the Due Process Clause in the town’s 
enforcement of her restraining order against her estranged husband, who later killed their 
three children); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194–97 (1989) 
(holding that the Due Process Clause does not impose affirmative obligations on local officials 
to protect an infant from his abusive father, even after local officials receive reports of possible 
abuse). 
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Supreme Court has generally interpreted constitutional provisions as having 
nothing at all to say about non-governmental choices. That is so even if those 
constitutional provisions (like the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and 
unusual punishments”20) whose text does not expressly say they are limited 
to the acts of some level of government—in contrast with, for example, the 
First Amendment21 and the Fourteenth,22 which are limited by their very 
terms to government action. One might accordingly say that the 
constitutional principle limiting the Constitution’s reach to “state action” is 
an unwritten command derived from the Constitution as a whole—a 
command that the Court has essentially “heard” in the sounds of 
constitutional silence. 
So, for example, however cruel and extraordinary a parent’s punishment 
of a supposedly misbehaving child might be, even a parent clearly guilty of 
child abuse in violation of state or local law could not be deemed to have 
violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against inflicting “cruel and 
unusual punishments”—despite the fact that the Amendment is literally 
silent as to whether its prohibition restricts only government actors. So too a 
terrorist guilty of mass murder in violation of federal law would not have 
deprived anyone of life “without due process of law,” which the Fifth 
Amendment requires the Federal Government to provide before it executes 
someone. And that is the case even though the Fifth Amendment’s text, 
unlike that of the Fourteenth, contains no explicit limitation on government 
action.23 
Of course, even though the Fourteenth Amendment by its terms 
prevents only states from depriving people of life (or liberty or property) 
without due process of law and bans only state deprivation of “the equal 
protection of the laws,”24 it would be entirely possible and indeed proper to 
hold a state government that knowingly permits the beating or killing of an 
individual while looking the other way responsible for indirectly depriving 
that person of life or liberty without “due process of law,” in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.25 And if the practice of looking the other way 
targets members of a racial or religious minority, then that selective 
 
 20. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 23. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 25. Cf. TRIBE, supra note 16, at 8–12 (discussing the dissents in DeShaney v. Winnebago 
Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203–213 (1989)). 
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“inaction” by a state could well amount to a denial of equal protection of the 
laws.26 
Developing and understanding the constitutional doctrines that 
determine when the requisite “state action” is present and when it is absent 
turns out to be particularly challenging. My treatise ended by summing up 
the final chapter—the one analyzing those doctrines—as a chapter about 
“what we do not want particular constitutional provisions to control.”27 And 
I closed the book with the question: “[I]s it not fitting that a book about the 
Constitution should close by studying what the Constitution is not about?”28 
Needless to say, there are plenty of things besides private action that the 
Constitution is “not about.” As Chief Justice John Marshall emphasized in 
Marbury v. Madison,29 decided in 1803, the Constitution is not about what 
Marshall called purely discretionary choices left to the political branches,30 
like the president’s choice of whom to nominate to the Court31 or Congress’s 
choice of how best to regulate interstate or foreign commerce, or whether to 
facilitate commercial and fiscal activity by chartering a national bank.32 
The Constitution is about certain limits on permissible political choices. 
Sometimes, the Supreme Court holds that a particular constitutional limit 
has been exceeded—as it held in Marbury with respect to Congress’s attempt 
to expand the Court’s own jurisdiction beyond the limits set by Article III.33 
In doing so, the Court exercises a power of “judicial review” that Marbury 
proclaimed was part, even if a silent part, of the entire constitutional plan.34 
But many of the most important Supreme Court decisions take the form 
of holding that a particular limit either has not been exceeded or, more 
fundamentally, that the asserted limit is not in fact part of the Constitution at 
all. The holding of Marshall’s 1819 opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland,35 for 
instance, was that—unlike the Articles of Confederation, which had limited 
federal authority to the powers the Articles “expressly delegated” to the 
 
 26. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197 n.3 (“The State may not, of course, selectively deny its 
protective services to certain disfavored minorities without violating the Equal Protection 
Clause.”) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)). 
 27. TRIBE, supra note 16, at 1174. 
 28. Id. 
 29. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 30. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170. 
 31. See id. at 167. 
 32. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 422–23 (1819). 
 33. Id. at 175–76. 
 34. See id. at 179–80. 
 35. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
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national government36—the 1787 Constitution, in deliberately omitting the 
word “expressly,” entrusted to the national government certain 
unenumerated powers reasonably related to its delegated missions of 
regulating commerce and the like.37 In upholding congressional power to 
charter a national bank in McCulloch, Marshall thus heard a message in the 
sound of silence that he detected when comparing the Constitution with the 
Articles that had preceded it. 
As students of American constitutional history know well, there was a 
period from the late 19th century until 1937 during which the Supreme Court 
heard a very different message, one less tolerant of centralized federal power 
and more protective of so-called “states’ rights.”38 When the Court in 1918 
struck down congressional legislation banning the interstate shipment of the 
products of child labor, for instance, in Hammer v. Dagenhart,39 it went so 
far as to reinsert the key word “expressly” into its stingier summary of 
national legislative power!40  
* * * 
The point of this largely autobiographical introduction is to motivate the 
discussion that follows by setting out some concrete examples of what I 
mean by “constitutional silence” and how it pervades all of constitutional 
law. 
It is a commonplace that much of what our Supreme Court does 
involves filling in the “great silences of the Constitution,” as Justice Robert 
Jackson put it when striking down the protectionist dairy regulation that 
New York State enacted without congressional authorization in 1949 in H.P. 
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond.41 That decision was one of many 
implementing what has come to be called the “dormant Commerce Clause,” 
a set of unwritten constitutional principles limiting state commercial 
regulation in the face of congressional silence coupled with the 
Constitution’s delegation to Congress of the power to regulate interstate 
commerce.42 Although the silence of the Constitution’s text with respect to 
such state regulation has not been construed to forbid or abolish it 
altogether, it has been understood to limit it considerably. Alexander 
 
 36. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. II. 
 37. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406. 
 38. See generally Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 
1933–1946, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1946). 
 39. 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)). 
 40. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 275. 
 41. 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949). 
 42. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1029–43 (3d ed. 
2000). 
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Hamilton’s Federalist 83, dedicated to the relationship between the state and 
federal courts in the plan of the new Constitution, spoke of such limiting 
silences, noting “the wide difference between silence and abolition.”43 
What may be more commonplace is the proposition that constitutional 
silences, like silences of other kinds, aren’t just occasional gaps or omissions 
in an otherwise-seamless design. They’re everywhere and come in as many 
flavors and varieties as sounds. Ambiguity and multiplicity of meanings are 
in a sense manifestations of silence. There are as many reasons to be silent as 
there are to speak, and as many ways to hear meaning in the sounds of 
silence. 
But words are partly silent too. In his book Gardens: An Essay on the 
Human Condition, Robert Pogue Harrison recalls the portion of Phaedrus in 
which Socrates compares the obvious silence of paintings to the subtler 
silence of written words.44 Socrates says “you might suppose that they 
understand what they are saying, but if you ask [written words] what they 
mean by anything they simply return the same answer over and over 
again.”45 Every sentence, every phrase, is in part silent with respect to how a 
reader or listener is to go about attributing meaning to it—how narrowly or 
literally it is to be taken; what significance is to be attributed to what it 
excludes along with what it includes; how its context, both elsewhere in the 
same text and in preceding and comparable texts, ought to figure in what it 
conveys.46 
Two Supreme Court decisions, Bush v. Gore47 in 2000 and Arizona State 
Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission48 in 2015, both 
decided by the narrowest of margins, dramatically illustrate the enormous 
leeway Justices perceive in the answers they hear when they ask either 
somewhat general language, like “equal protection of the laws,” or seemingly 
specific terms, like “the Legislature” of “each State,” what those words, in 
Socrates’s terms, “mean” to be communicating. 
 
 43. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 441 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005). 
 44. ROBERT POGUE HARRISON, GARDENS: AN ESSAY ON THE HUMAN CONDITION 61 
(2008). 
 45. Id. (quoting PLATO, PHAEDRUS AND THE SEVENTH AND EIGHTH LETTERS 97 (Walter 
Hamilton trans., 1973)). 
 46. See 2 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 135 (Charles 
Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 4th prtg. 1978) (“A sign, or representamen, is something which 
stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity”). 
 47. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 48. 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015). 
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In Bush, a case in which I played the role of an advocate,49 the key 
concurring opinion by then–Chief Justice Rehnquist understood the word 
“Legislature” (as applied to Florida) to convey a single federal meaning.50 
The Chief deemed this meaning independent of the Florida Supreme Court’s 
holding that the State’s Constitution must be consulted in order to decide 
what the Florida Legislature must be understood to have prescribed as the 
State’s method for selecting presidential electors.51 The four justices 
dissenting on that basic point would have held, I think rightly, that it is up to 
each State to decide in its own constitution (subject only to federal 
constitutional protections for the State’s residents) not only how that State’s 
“Legislature” is to be composed but also what counts as a permissible 
method for that “Legislature” to “appoint . . . Electors” for purposes of 
casting that State’s votes in the Electoral College.52 
In Arizona Legislature, the majority opinion by Justice Ginsburg 
understood the word “Legislature” (as applied to Arizona) to encompass the 
State’s entire electorate, voting in a statewide referendum.53 This 
interpretation led to the conclusion that Arizona had complied with the 
Constitution’s requirement that each State’s “Legislature” make legislative 
apportionment decisions by adopting in that State’s constitution a 
referendum mechanism for delegating that lawmaking power to the people 
as a whole.54 Appealing as I found the majority’s idea that a State’s 
constitution could provide that its electorate would share lawmaking 
authority on equal footing with the State’s Legislature—an approach that 
creatively addressed the problem of partisan gerrymandering by an 
incumbent-protecting legislative body—I found the dissenting opinions of 
Chief Justice Roberts,55 joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, and of 
Justice Scalia,56 joined by Justice Thomas, difficult to fault analytically. 
Whatever conclusion one reaches in such cases, the important lesson I 
draw from them for purposes of an inquiry into silence is that we should 
beware of “hearing” silences where nearly all readers, setting aside how they 
would like a particular controversy to end, identify determinative text that 
fills up the relevant field. “The heart has its reasons,” as Pascal famously said, 
 
 49. See Laurence H. Tribe, eroG .v hsuB and Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from Its 
Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170 (2001). 
 50. Bush, 531 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 51. Compare id. at 115, with Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1254 (Fla.), rev’d sub nom. 
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 52. Bush, 531 U.S. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 53. Ariz. Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2671. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 2677–94 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 56. Id. at 2694–99 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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“that reason does not know.” Good enough. And those heartfelt reasons 
deserve a hearing. But when they defy reason, the meaning of living by the 
rule of law is that reason should prevail. 
* * * 
My work over the years has included both studying existing 
constitutions, particularly that of the United States, and assisting others with 
the drafting of new constitutions—from the Marshall Islands to the Czech 
Republic to South Africa. Among the things I noticed was that those 
undertakings, although distinct, were related—and related most significantly 
in the way that formative decisions about what to say and what not to say in 
a new constitution have bearing on later decisions about how to interpret 
what a constitution says or fails to say. 
My decision to pay special attention to the various roles of silence in the 
distinct but related projects of constitution-making and constitution-
interpreting57 was underscored by an observation a law student of mine 
(Louis Fisher, J.D. 2016) once made about how he had been struck by the 
“presence of absence” in Berlin’s modern urban landscape. My student was 
moved by the way Berlin harnessed the “power of negative space in framing 
the public memory of World War II, from skeletal monuments outlining 
former churches to negative-space sculptures of murdered Jewish families.” 
I was born in Shanghai to Russian Jewish refugees, many of whose 
closest relatives had perished in the pogroms of Russia or had been silenced 
in the ultimate sense at the hands of the Nazis. That made this image of 
absence particularly vivid and meaningful to me. As I look back at where I 
came from and what I’ve done over the course of my professional life, it 
strikes me that attempting to organize and give structure to the study of legal 
silence has been a primary purpose of much of what I have written and 
taught over the past half-century. In recent years, I decided to focus more 
systematically on that attempt in an advanced seminar I have been teaching 
at Harvard Law School and, to a lesser degree, in courses I have taught as a 
University Professor to Harvard College undergraduates. This paper is an 
outgrowth of that effort—an outline of how I hope to pursue it in the years 
that remain, and how I hope others will pursue it as well. 
I. DOOR-CLOSING SILENCES V. DOOR-OPENING SILENCES 
The introduction to this paper discussed both (1) the absence of the 
qualifying word “expressly” from the description of the powers “delegated” 
 
 57. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, There Is Nothing That Interpretation Just Is, 30 
CONST. COMMENT. 193 (2015). 
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to the national government in the 1787 Constitution, and (2) the absence of 
any reference to nontrespassory “eavesdropping,” whether aided or unaided 
by technology, from the Fourth Amendment’s ban on “unreasonable 
searches and seizures.” Both were offered as examples of constitutional 
silences that have required interpretation by the Supreme Court. 
The difference between those two silences is at least as important as the 
similarities. The Court in McCulloch treated the first silence as strongly 
suggestive of a binding decision in the Constitution to entrust the U.S. 
Government—in that case, the newly established Congress—with less tightly 
constrained powers vis-à-vis the States than the unsuccessful Articles of 
Confederation had entrusted to the Continental Congress.58 
That silence, understood in light of what Chief Justice Marshall argued 
were the purposes of the Constitution, closed the door to a decentralizing 
approach that had been deemed inadequate at the Constitution’s founding. 
When the Court in Hammer later reopened that door by essentially 
reinserting a constraining term that had been deliberately erased, it did so 
without any persuasive argument that changed circumstances (or a better 
understanding of our founding history) justified the turnabout.59 That step 
simply substituted the constitutional vision of the justices who sat in 1918 
for that reflected in the 1787 Constitution as ratified in 1789. The fact that 
this substitution, and the dramatically narrower view of national authority it 
represented, lasted for less than half a century and was announced more as 
an ipse dixit than with a plausible explanation doesn’t in itself prove that the 
majority in 1918 was wrong. It does, however, reinforce a conclusion that 
that era’s attempted reversal of the trajectory on which the founding 
generation set the nation was misguided.60 
The Court in Katz treated the Constitution’s silence with respect to 
electronic eavesdropping as reflective of no decision either way on whether a 
requirement of reasonableness (and a presumption that the absence of a 
 
 58. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819). 
 59. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918) (overruled by United States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)). 
 60. The period from the 1890s to 1937, when the Hammer v. Dagenhart era came to an 
abrupt end with the decision in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 395 (1937) 
(upholding a state’s minimum wage law), is often described as the “Lochner era,” named after 
the 1905 decision in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 62 (1905) (striking down a state’s 
maximum hours law). The complex jurisprudential currents—and the politics of judicial 
appointments—that led to the simultaneous turnaround in the narrow vision of both 
congressional economic power (a shift usually associated with the decision in NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 43 (1937) (upholding key provisions of the National Labor 
Relations Act), and state economic power during that roughly half-century-long era is beyond 
the scope of this paper. For competing views on this period of doctrinal history, compare 
EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS STATES RIGHTS (1936), with RANDY E. 
BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2004). 
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warrant normally triggers a conclusion of unreasonableness) should be 
imposed on invisible privacy intrusions—intrusions involving no tangible 
entrance into a physical area occupied by the target of the government’s 
surveillance.61 Government eavesdropping of the only kind that would have 
been possible in 1789–91 may well have been thought at the time of the 
Framing, as Justice Black’s dissent insisted, to fall entirely outside the 
category of banned government intrusions into the “right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects”—the right that the 
Fourth Amendment expressly protects from “unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”62 As the dissent said, citing Blackstone’s famous 18th century 
Commentaries, “eavesdropping . . . was . . . ‘an ancient practice which at 
common law was condemned as a nuisance.’ ”63 “In those days,” Justice 
Black observed, “the eavesdropper listened by naked ear under the eaves of 
houses or their windows, or beyond their walls seeking out private 
discourse,”64 and enhancing the ear’s listening power technologically, Black 
insisted, made no difference as a matter of principle: because “the Framers 
were aware of [physical eavesdropping]” and could easily have “used the 
appropriate language” to subject all eavesdropping to the Constitution’s 
constraints (of having to obtain a warrant and the like), Justice Black treated 
the silence the Framers chose on the matter as decisive.65 In so doing, he 
overlooked the far-greater threat to freedom of undeterred “private 
communication”66 posed by potentially ubiquitous and undiscoverable 
electronic surveillance than by occasional government agents lurking under 
the “eaves of houses or their windows” where observant occupants might 
detect their presence.67 At least with respect to such forms of surveillance, 
treating the silence of those who made the Constitution and its amendments 
the law of the land as preclusive punishes all of us for the fact that the 
Framers were not endowed with the gift of prophecy. It is indefensible to 
treat all constitutional silences as though they reflected strategic choices with 
respect to something different in kind from what could have been 
anticipated. Sometimes, as the saying goes, a cigar is just a cigar. 
Justice Black was certainly smart enough to understand all that. The 
driving force behind his approach was not a misguided belief that his 
insistence on a narrow and time-bound reading of the protective words of 
 
 61. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
 62. Id. at 365 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV). 
 63. Id. at 366 (quoting Berger v. New York 388 U.S. 41, 45 (1967)). 
 64. Id. (quoting Berger, 388 U.S. at 45). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 352. 
 67. Id. at 366 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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the Bill of Rights would best capture the Constitution’s underlying purposes 
notwithstanding changed scientific or social conditions. Rather, the driving 
force behind Black’s approach was institutional in character. It was a long-
standing hostility to judicial extrapolation from a constitutional provision’s 
underlying purposes as translated to “keep the Constitution up to date” or 
“to bring it into harmony with the times.”68 That view, reflective of Black’s 
deep belief that the “history of governments proves that it is dangerous to 
freedom to repose such powers in courts,” was a staple of his 
jurisprudence.69 He famously equated entrusting politically unaccountable 
justices with that kind of “translating” authority with making the Court “a 
continuously functioning constitutional convention.”70 
This is not the place to engage in the ongoing “originalism” debate over 
whether fidelity to the Constitution requires (or even permits) an approach 
as literal as that of Justice Black.71 Despite the colorful rebirth of that 
approach in the jurisprudence of the late Justice Antonin Scalia and its 
persistence in the opinions of Justice Clarence Thomas, it has not been the 
approach followed by other justices in the Court’s history, including any 
(other than Justice Thomas) who serve today.72 My purpose in this paper is 
not to pursue that debate by rehearsing the arguments that I and many 
others have made against that approach. Suffice it to say here that only an 
approach paying much closer attention to the underlying purposes of 
constitutional structures and rights-protecting provisions can account for the 
bulk of the Supreme Court’s interpretive work over the last 75 years or so.73 
To account for decisions like Katz (and a plethora of others, including 
Griswold74), it is necessary to avoid a door-closing approach to the 
 
 68. Id. at 373. 
 69. Id. at 374. 
 70. Id. at 373; see also HOWARD BALL, HUGO L. BLACK: COLD STEEL WARRIOR 109–12 
(1996). 
 71. Plenty has been written on this debate already. Compare, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, 
THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (Geoffrey R. Stone ed., 2010); and LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE 
INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION (2008); and H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of 
Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985), with, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Alternatives to 
Originalism?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 479 (1996); Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and 
the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127 (1998); William H. Rehnquist, The 
Notion of A Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law 
Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the 
Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3 
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 
(1989). 
 72. LAURENCE TRIBE & JOSHUA MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: THE ROBERTS COURT AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 8–13, 141, 142 (2014). 
 73. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 2013). 
 74. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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Constitution’s silences in the absence of the kind of analysis that Marshall 
employed in McCulloch when evaluating the Constitution’s demonstrably 
deliberate omission of limiting language that the Articles had contained in 
describing national lawmaking authority. If one is determined to preserve 
the underlying point of a constitutional provision, it is essential to keep in 
mind Marshall’s admonition in McCulloch that “it is a constitution we are 
expounding”—one designed to “endure for ages.”75 An approach that would 
demand updating the text itself through frequent invocation of the 
deliberately difficult amendment process of Article V to account for changes 
wrought by time and technology would generate a document far more prolix 
and detailed than many of those to whom the Constitution is addressed 
could plausibly absorb or would be likely to cherish as the nation’s founding 
document. 
Among the features of the Constitution that seem to me crucial to its 
success over the centuries is the widespread recognition of its character not 
as a set of disconnected points but as a connected structure that, despite its 
gaps—some deliberate and others unintended—invites understanding as a 
coherent, if not always internally consistent, whole. So, for example, the 
Fourth Amendment’s promises as elaborated in Katz are separated in space 
if not by time from the First Amendment’s simultaneously ratified 
prohibition on laws “abridging the freedom of speech.”76 But the Court in 
Katz recognized, without having to cite the First Amendment, that it had to 
read the Fourth Amendment broadly enough to avoid unjustifiably 
undermining the system of open and undeterred communication that the 
First Amendment was dedicated to protecting.77 
Two years after Katz, when the Court in Stanley v. Georgia78 held that 
government cannot criminalize someone for the mere private possession or 
observation of books or films whose “obscene” content stripped them of 
First Amendment protection in the course of commercial distribution or 
display, it was clear that neither the First Amendment nor the Fourth, taken 
alone, could explain the Court’s conclusion.79 Much that occurs inside a 
“private” living space, from spousal or child abuse to bomb-making and even 
the solitary consumption of prohibited substances, may be investigated and 
prosecuted so long as the Fourth Amendment’s procedural requirements are 
satisfied; and the private possession of the products of sexual exploitation of 
actual children, for instance, can be criminalized consistent with the First 
 
 75. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 415 (1819). 
 76. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 77. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). 
 78. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
 79. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564–68; id. at 569–72 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result). 
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Amendment—as a narrowly tailored means of drying up the market for such 
material.80 Government power deployed in service of that end is wholly 
unlike government power exercised to prevent some unwanted impact on 
the psyche of the private beholder. To prosecute someone simply for finding 
satisfaction or excitement in widely deplored visual stimuli or ideas would, 
the Stanley Court held, impinge on the “freedom of the mind,” a concept 
that—although nowhere mentioned in the Constitution’s text—was part of 
the connective tissue that linked the First Amendment’s underlying purposes 
and postulates to those of the Fourth.81 
So too with government information-gathering that could not, by any 
linguistic stretch, be seen as entailing conduct within the ambit of the Fourth 
Amendment’s restraints on “searches and seizures” even as that notion was 
expanded in Katz. 
Consider, for instance, wide-ranging and deeply probing background 
investigations into and interrogations of individuals seeking various 
government benefits, like employment with NASA.82 The issue presented in 
such cases is not the legitimacy of giving a broader definition to 
constitutional terms reaching us from centuries earlier—as with stretching 
the terms “search” and “seizure” to encompass high-tech variants (for 
example, electronic surveillance or, as in Kyllo v. United States in 2001, 
thermal imaging enabling government to “see” through the walls of a private 
home83) unimaginable when the words were first used in the Constitution.84 
The issue is rather the legitimacy of drawing lines to link disparate 
constitutional provisions like the First and Fourth Amendments, as the 
Court implicitly did in Katz, in order to treat forms of government intrusion 
into personal control over private information as potentially outlawed by the 
Constitution even though clearly beyond the reach of any particular 
prohibition. 
 
 80. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108–10 (1990). 
 81. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 560, 565–66. And yet, as recently as August 2016, the 
Eleventh Circuit upheld a municipal ordinance banning the sale or rental of sex toys against a 
Fourteenth Amendment challenge made by a woman suffering from multiple sclerosis who 
sought to use sex toys to “facilitate intimacy” with her husband and by an artist who used 
sexual devices in his artwork. Flanigan’s Enterprises, Inc. of Ga. v. City of Sandy Springs, No. 
14-15499, 2016 WL 4088731, at *1–*2 (11th Cir. Aug. 2, 2016). Although the case didn’t 
involve prosecuting mere private possession and use—and thus the court had no occasion to 
compare or contrast Stanley—it makes little sense to limit Stanley’s logic to protect one’s right 
to create and use a sex toy at home but not one’s right to acquire such a toy elsewhere. 
 82. E.g., NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 140–42 (2011). 
 83. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 84. See id. at 31–32; see also Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 
1165 (1993). 
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Specifically, the puzzle in cases like NASA v. Nelson85 in 2011 is whether 
to treat the Constitution’s verbal isolation of several distinct points (like the 
First and Fourth Amendments) along a broader spectrum that implicates the 
same general set of values (there, values of “informational privacy”86) as 
though the silence between those points represents a negation of any 
constitutional right that falls outside the points isolated.87 Doing so would 
entail unjustifiably treating the absence of language expressly connecting the 
distinct constitutional provisions as a “door-closing” silence, in the parlance 
of this essay. The alternative would be to treat the absence of connecting 
language linking the provisions in question as a “door-opening” silence: an 
open invitation to bring within constitutional control other kinds of 
government action that impinge on the same set of overlapping values even 
though falling outside the points expressly isolated in the Constitution’s text. 
As we will see in the section of this essay dealing with rules of 
construction or interpretation bearing on textual gaps or omissions, the text is 
in fact not entirely silent on that choice of approaches. But even if it were, it’s 
important to note that one option open to constitutional interpreters is to 
remain silent about how to read the Constitution’s silence on the existence of a 
general right to informational privacy beyond either the First Amendment or 
the Fourth. That is exactly what the Supreme Court did in the NASA case, 
where the majority opinion written by Justice Alito held that the 
government’s non-physical “probes” into the personal backgrounds of 
people seeking government employment to work on improving the Hubble 
Telescope’s ability to conduct deep space probes were not too invasive to 
comply with whatever unwritten constitutional right of “informational 
privacy” might exist.88 Concurring in the result but dissenting from the 
majority’s approach, Justice Thomas and the late Justice Scalia all but tore 
their hair out over the Court’s insistence on leaving that question 
unanswered. To them, it seemed obvious that the silence of the 
Constitution’s text on the existence of a right of informational privacy had a 
door-closing character, given the fact that distinctive dimensions of what 
such a right might be designed to protect were indeed picked out and 
protected by a specific constitutional provision.89 
 
 85. 562 U.S. 134 (2011). 
 86. NASA, 562 U.S. at 146 
 87. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted) (“[L]iberty is not a series of isolated points . . . . It is a rational continuum which, 
broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and 
purposeless restraints . . . .). 
 88. NASA, 562 U.S. at 159; see also id. at 161 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 89. Id. at 161–62 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But right-leaning jurists are not the only ones 
who fall into this trap. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 336–40 (2001) 
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The place of silences in judicial opinions about the Constitution—a 
matter on which the majority and the concurring justices in NASA strongly 
disagreed—will be taken up in a later section of this essay, distinguishing 
silences about what the Constitution commands, permits, or prohibits from 
silences in what courts say about the Constitution. But first it is important to 
focus on the substantive issue that divided the Alito majority from the 
Scalia/Thomas concurrence. That is the issue of whether the existence of a 
broad right of informational privacy should be deemed precluded by the 
juxtaposition of the Constitution’s silence about such a wide-ranging right 
with its textual protection of more narrowly defined rights that are, in a sense, 
subspecies of that broad right. The alternative is to regard the silence as to 
the existence of such a right as potentially leaving the matter open. 
That the specially concurring justices in NASA focused solely on the 
Fourth Amendment as the relevant narrower right and paid no attention to 
the First isn’t of particular significance for present purposes; what counts is 
their assertion that, whenever the Constitution narrowly protects a particular 
value from one or another species of invasion, its failure to protect that value 
from other invasions as well (and, indeed, from the broad genus of invasions 
of which the species isolated is but one example) should be taken to slam the 
door on the possibility that such other invasions might be constitutionally 
foreclosed.90 That canon of construction, beyond being incompatible with 
how the Constitution itself tells readers to treat certain kinds of gaps or 
silences (as we will see below), makes sense only in a constitution conceived 
as a set of isolated and self-contained points rather than a constitution 
regarded as a coherent whole. And that is certainly not the way Chief Justice 
Marshall conceived it in the seminal McCulloch case. 
To return briefly to Marshall’s analysis in McCulloch, its method—
which Professor Akhil Amar has aptly termed “intertextual”—proceeded in 
significant part by comparing the words of the Constitution with the words 
of the text it replaced.91 Rounding out the summary of Marshall’s method, 
it’s noteworthy that he also employed “intratextual” comparisons when 
considering constitutional silences and the significance they should be 
accorded.92 For instance, Marshall contrasted the Constitution’s clause 
empowering Congress “To make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other 
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
 
(opinion for the Court by Souter, J.) (rejecting the view that the Due Process Clause “forbade 
peace officers to arrest without a warrant for misdemeanors” on the ground that founders were 
not concerned enough about the practice to prohibit it in the most relevant specific provision, 
the Fourth Amendment). 
 90.  See NASA, 562 U.S. at 161. 
 91. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 799–800 (1999). 
 92. See id. at 756–57. 
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States”93 with the Constitution’s ban on state actions that, without 
congressional consent, “lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, 
except what may be absolutely necessary for executing [the state’s] inspection 
Laws.”94 The Constitution’s silence with respect to the degree of “necessity” 
required to comply with the Necessary and Proper Clause rightly reinforced 
Marshall’s conclusion that this silence underscored the degree of deference 
courts owed to Congress in its judgment of just how essential a measure was 
for “carrying into execution” various delegated powers.95 
Nor are textual comparisons, whether “inter” or “intra,” the only 
relevant ways of distinguishing deliberate (and thus presumptively door-
closing) silences or omissions from unintended (and thus presumptively 
door-opening) silences or omissions. Consider, to address a truly 
fundamental example, the topic of secession from the Union. Unlike the 
Articles of Confederation, which expressly said that the States ratifying the 
Articles in 1781 had entered into a “perpetual Union,”96 the Constitution 
ratified in 1791 said nothing at all about the possibility of dissolving the 
“more perfect Union” described in the Preamble.97 
We all know how tensions over slavery among the 13 states that entered 
into the new Union required referring to that “peculiar institution” only 
euphemistically—with code words like “such Persons as any of the States now 
existing shall think proper to admit,”98 and “all other Persons” (as contrasted 
with “free Persons”) in the infamous three-fifths clause,99 as well as in Article 
V’s explicit carve-out for any constitutional amendments that might end the 
slave trade (again identified only obliquely and without ever mentioning the 
dreaded word) before 1808.100 
Less often foregrounded was the way tensions at the Founding over 
possible secession by any State that wished to exit evidently required no 
mention of the Union’s indissolubility, which the Court in its 1869 decision 
in Texas v. White treated as so self-evidently axiomatic as to go without 
saying.101 In my 2008 book, The Invisible Constitution, I treated that anti-
secession axiom as now firmly a part of our “unwritten Constitution.”102 But 
 
 93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added). 
 94. Id. art. I, § 10 (emphasis added). 
 95. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 387–88 (1819). 
 96. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, pmbl. 
 97. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 98. Id. art. I., § 9 (emphasis added). 
 99. Id. art. I., § 2 (emphasis added). 
 100. Id. art. V. 
 101. See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 700 (1868). 
 102. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 28–29 (2008). 
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whether one agrees or disagrees, any such axiom is certainly not written in 
ink on parchment. Rather, it was inscribed in blood on the killing fields of 
the Civil War when the Union prevailed over the Confederacy—before the 
axiom had been given the Court’s doctrinal blessing in the Texas case. 
The same issue arises on the international stage in the modern era. I 
think back to working in Prague in the early 1990s with Pierre Trudeau, who 
had served several years earlier (1968–1979 and 1980–1984) as Canada’s 
prime minister. We were part of a group assisting Vaclav Havel in drafting a 
new constitution for Czechoslovakia after it broke in late 1989 from the 
USSR (in the so-called “Velvet Revolution”) but before it eventually split into 
two nations in 1993, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. One especially 
difficult issue was whether to include a provision expressly addressing the 
possible secession of what later became Slovakia. Trudeau had grappled with 
similar questions with respect to Quebec long before Canada’s highest court, 
in Reference Re Secession of Quebec, held unilateral secession by Quebec to be 
unlawful.103 Trudeau recognized that remaining silent in the Czech/Slovak 
situation about the secession issue might not hold off the centrifugal forces 
pulling Czechoslovakia apart, but he nonetheless advised, I think wisely, that 
those forces not be encouraged by providing a clear path to national 
dissolution in the newly independent country’s written constitution. 
In other historic circumstances, such as the formation of the EU in the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1992104 as amended by the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, which 
included Article 50, regularizing the secession process that Great Britain 
voted to initiate when “leave” prevailed over “stay” in Brexit, the formation 
and widely accepted legitimacy of a founding document for a nation or for a 
confederation of nations might preclude leaving such matters unspoken.105 
In such instances, the matter of unilateral exit might have to be squarely 
addressed in advance despite the prospect that doing so might make the 
entire effort fall apart prior to its launch, or might make future exit, and the 
early collapse of the constitutional project, more likely. The pros and cons of 
addressing the secession issue at the outset in any particular setting, as my 
Harvard colleague Vicki Jackson has carefully shown, are complex and 
contextually dependent.106 
Deeply related both to slavery and to national unity is the Constitution’s 
all but complete silence on the profoundly significant topic of race, a subject 
 
 103. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 104 (Can.). 
 104. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1, 1 C.M.L.R. 719. 
 105. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, art. 50, Dec. 17, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1. 
 106. Vicki C. Jackson, Comparative Constitutional Federalism and Transnational Judicial 
Discourse, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 91, 121–23 (2004); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Secession, 
Transnational Precedents, and Constitutional Silences, in NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION IN 
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 314–42 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2016). 
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that no history of the United States purporting to explain anything of 
importance can afford to ignore. Only the Fifteenth Amendment so much as 
mentions race, and it does so only in the context of the right of U.S. citizens 
to vote in state or federal elections.107 (Interestingly, the Constitution is also 
silent on the existence of any general “right to vote,”108 confining itself to the 
prohibition of disenfranchisement on account of “race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude” (Fifteenth Amendment);109 the guarantee that U.S. 
Senators shall be “elected by the people” of their respective States 
(Seventeenth Amendment);110 the prohibition of disenfranchisement on 
account of “sex” (Nineteenth Amendment);111 the prohibition of 
disenfranchisement for “failure to pay any poll tax or other tax” (Twenty-
fourth Amendment);112 and the prohibition of disenfranchisement “on 
account of age” for “citizens . . . eighteen years of age or older” (Twenty-
Sixth Amendment)113) 
Although Justice Scalia once wrote—incorrectly, as it turns out—that the 
Fourteenth Amendment expressly bars states from making distinctions 
among individuals on the basis of their race,114 it does no such thing. Rather, 
it is conspicuously silent on the degree to which, and the circumstances in 
which, government may use racial classifications to decide whom it may 
reward with particular opportunities, employ for particular purposes, target 
for particular burdens, or otherwise single out for other than purely data-
gathering purposes. In fact, Fisher v. University of Texas,115 decided in 2016, 
was the first case in thirteen years116 (and only the third case ever)117 in 
 
 107. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 108. Heather K. Gerken, The Right to Vote: Is the Amendment Game Worth the Candle?, 
23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 11, 11 (2014); see generally Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: 
The Exceptional History of the Right to Vote, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1345 (2003). 
 109. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 110. Id. amend. XVII. 
 111. Id. amend. XIX. 
 112. Id. amend. XXIV. 
 113. Id. amend. XXVI. 
 114. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1639 (2014) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (“Does the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment forbid what its text plainly requires? Needless to say (except that this case obliges 
us to say it), the question answers itself. ‘The Constitution proscribes government 
discrimination on the basis of race, and state-provided education is no exception.’ ”) (quoting 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (second emphasis added)). 
 115. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). 
 116. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (decided 13 years earlier). 
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which the Court upheld a government affirmative action program expressly 
taking the race of individuals into account in allocating benefits or 
burdens—there, admission slots in a state’s universities, allocated to achieve 
educational diversity. 
In this essay, I will not address the merits of that decision, which I have 
elsewhere applauded,118 but I will note that, particularly in the context of 
characterizing the decision as (a) going out of its way to decide large 
constitutional questions that might better have been left open, (b) being 
suitably modest and admirably minimal about how much to resolve, or (c) 
not going far enough to button down the constitutional issues left up in the 
air, it turns out, unsurprisingly, that how observers characterize what the 
Court did or failed to do seems more a function of their preferred style of 
adjudication and degree of judicial intervention than on any intrinsic 
characteristic of the Court’s ruling.119 
The same can be said of the sequence of Supreme Court decisions along 
the path to marriage equality and toward a strong constitutional norm of 
nondiscrimination with respect to sexual orientation and/or gender 
identity—the decisions from Romer v. Evans120 in 1996 to Lawrence v. 
Texas121 in 2003 to United States v. Windsor122 in 2013 to Obergefell v. 
Hodges123 in 2015 to whatever future case extends the principles of those 
holdings to discrimination between transgender and cisgender individuals. 
All of those decisions, of course, hung their constitutional protections on the 
textual hooks of due process and equal protection. But they did so by 
invoking and elaborating underlying principles of personal liberty, privacy, 
and equal dignity not to be found anywhere in the Constitution’s express 
 
 117. See id. (upholding race-conscious law school admissions program); Metro Broad., 
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (upholding race-conscious programs to promote minority 
ownership and control in the broadcasting industry), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
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of Texas, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2016), 
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terms.124 In that sense, all were children of Griswold v. Connecticut125 and its 
abortion-related progeny, Roe v. Wade126 and Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.127 
From the perspective of either constitutional silence or silence in 
decisions construing the Constitution, this arc of rulings is a treasure trove 
of insights too far-reaching to be elaborated here. Suffice it to say that the 
engine driving those decisions was as much external to both the 
Constitution’s text and the legal process as internal to either. Chief Justice 
Roberts was surely incorrect when he wrote in his bitter Obergefell dissent 
that the post-Obergefell celebrations of marriage equality were not 
celebrations of the Constitution because, in his words, “[the Constitution] 
had nothing to do with it.”128 The Constitution, in all its moving parts both 
legal and cultural, had everything to do with it. 
Especially notable, from the perspective of silence, is how the majority 
opinion in Obergefell, written by Justice Kennedy, treated the dissenting 
justices’ insistence that the Court was illegitimately redefining the institution 
of “marriage” without proof that the traditional, “one man + one woman” 
definition had been intentionally designed to denigrate or stigmatize same-
sex couples.129 But the dissenters missed the point. As the majority saw the 
matter, the exclusion of same-sex marriage from what the dissenters 
described as the traditional definition, while almost certainly not expressive 
at the time of homophobia or hatred of gays or lesbians, was reflective of 
unexamined assumptions that evolving understandings of liberty, equality, 
and dignity have rightly led succeeding generations to question.130 The 
Constitution’s text says nothing about marriage, let alone about same-sex 
marriage. But those silences were rightly treated by the Court as invitations to 
fill in the gaps, gaps not left in the document out of any deliberate design to 
treat that singularly important form of state-sanctioned relationship as 
unentitled to special constitutional solicitude or out of any deliberate design to 
treat same-sex couples as less worthy than their opposite-sex counterparts. In 
 
 124. See Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 
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 125. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 126. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 127. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Casey was also notable in that it finally identified the gender 
equality strand underlying the Court’s reproductive rights line of cases, 505 U.S. at 852–53 
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 129. See id.; id. at 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 130. Id. at 2598 (majority opinion). 
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the terms used in this essay, these were silences that allowed doors to open 
rather than force them to close. 
II. STRUCTURAL SILENCES V. SILENCES ABOUT RIGHTS 
The preceding section cut one major slice through the topic of silences, 
distinguishing those that effectively open a constitutional conversation by 
leaving a number of options on the table from those that shut such 
conversation down by essentially limiting the options to one. But of course 
that “one” remaining option—for instance, reading the Constitution’s 
delegations of power to the national government more broadly than those 
contained in the Articles of Confederation, or recognizing rights of 
informational privacy beyond those protected by the Fourth Amendment 
from unreasonable physical invasions of private property—typically leaves 
numerous sub-options open. As with Robert Frost’s “[t]wo roads [that] 
diverged in a yellow wood,”131 each road turns out to lead to numerous 
further paths at succeeding forks, just as do the capillaries that branch out 
from the circulatory system’s arteries. 
This section cuts a different slice through the same topic, dividing 
silences along a distinct axis. This division separates those silences that bear 
on the structure created by the Constitution from those that bear on the 
individual rights the Constitution protects against either a particular level or 
branch of government, or against government as a whole. 
This is not to say that these two topics are entirely distinct. Many 
Justices have been fond of pointing out that the structural checks and 
balances and divisions of governmental authority created by the 
Constitution—including both the horizontal divisions among the three 
federal branches elaborated by “separation of powers” doctrines and the 
vertical divisions between the federal government and the states elaborated 
by “federalism” doctrines—exist in no small part to shield individuals from 
overbearing, oppressive, or unaccountable government power.132 It remains 
 
 131. ROBERT FROST, The Road Not Taken, in MOUNTAIN INTERVAL 9, 9 (1916). 
 132. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 501 
(2010) (“[T]he Framers recognized that, in the long term, structural protections against abuse 
of power were critical to preserving liberty.”) (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730 
(1986)); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
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of powers. Separation of powers was designed to implement a fundamental insight: 
Concentration of power in the hands of a single branch is a threat to liberty.”); New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (“Just as the separation and independence of the 
coordinate branches of the Federal Government serves to prevent the accumulation of 
excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the 
Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.”) (quoting 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 710 (1988) 
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useful nonetheless to distinguish (a) gaps or silences in the Constitution’s 
description of how the federal branches relate to one another and to the 
states, from (b) gaps or silences in the Constitution’s description of the rights 
protected against each level or branch of government. 
It is arguably less important that the lines the Court ends up drawing 
provide clear guidance to the relevant government bodies when the Court 
identifies new categories of “unenumerated” rights—like the right to 
reproductive freedom or nondiscrimination based on sex-related or gender-
related characteristics—than when the Supreme Court undertakes to decide, 
in the face of what appears to be constitutional silence, whether: 
(1) an action by the federal executive branch unconstitutionally intrudes 
upon congressional authority and thereby impermissibly aggrandizes 
unilateral presidential power, as the Court did in striking down President 
Truman’s nationalization of the steel industry without prior authority from 
Congress in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer;133 or 
(2) an action by Congress unconstitutionally intrudes upon executive 
authority and thereby impermissibly aggrandizes legislative power, as the 
Court did in Zivotofsky v. Kerry in 2015;134 or 
(3) a law enacted by Congress unconstitutionally invades state 
prerogatives, as the Court did in part of its ruling about the Affordable Care 
Act in NFIB v. Sebelius in 2012;135 or 
(4) a state statute enters an area it is forbidden to enter without 
congressional permission by virtue of the so-called dormant Commerce 
Clause, as the Court has done on countless occasions;136 or 
(5) the federal executive branch can require state compliance with 
executive action, as the Court did in Medellin v. Texas;137 or 
(6) states impermissibly intrude on exclusively federal executive or 
legislative authority, as the Court did in Arizona v. United States.138 
In a paper I recently published in the online Forum of the Yale Law 
Journal, Transcending the Youngstown Triptych: A Multidimensional 
Reappraisal of Separation of Powers Doctrine, after exploring a problem 
closely related to that of constitutional silence—the problem of congressional 
silence—I argue that concern for the individual-rights consequences of 
 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“While the separation of powers may prevent us from righting every 
wrong, it does so in order to ensure that we do not lose liberty.”). 
 133. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 134. 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 
 135. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 136.  E.g., Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977). 
 137. 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 138. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
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resolving congressional-executive disputes one way rather than another has 
been a long-neglected dimension of the separation-of-powers puzzle.139 
I illustrate the point by taking a close look at the decision in Zivotofsky v. 
Kerry, where none of the Justices paid any attention to the consequences for 
the Zivotofsky family of how the Court resolved the dispute between the U.S. 
State Department and Congress.140 Congress had enacted a law specifying 
that when a U.S. citizen is born in Jerusalem to an American family living 
there that family is entitled upon request to have its baby’s U.S. passport 
stamped so as to identify Israel as the nation of the baby’s birth.141 The State 
Department, acting on the direction of a series of U.S. presidents, defied that 
law, denying the Zivotofsky family’s religiously motivated request on the 
theory that for U.S. passports to proclaim a view by the Executive Branch 
that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel would interfere with the policy of the 
Executive that the U.S. should remain neutral on the ongoing dispute over 
whether the government of Israel is indeed sovereign over all of Jerusalem.142 
A closely divided Supreme Court ruled for the Executive. Regardless of 
whether one agrees or disagrees with that unusual ruling—the second ever in 
which the Court upheld the authority of the Executive to defy a duly enacted 
federal statute143—I think that it was wrong for the Court to be silent on, and 
seemingly not even to consider, the individual rights arguments on the 
family’s side of the scale.144 
I will return in the third section of this paper to the broader question of 
when the Court should be silent on a constitutional matter and when it 
should instead address the matter squarely. For now, I turn to the extent to 
which the Constitution is or is not silent on the proper method of construing 
both structural and individual rights issues posed by constitutional cases and 
controversies. 
 
 139. Laurence H. Tribe, Transcending the Youngstown Triptych: A Multidimensional 
Reappraisal of Separation of Powers Doctrine, 126 YALE L.J. F. 86, 100 (2016). 
 140. Id. at 103–04. 
 141. Foreign Relations Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228 § 214(d), 
116 Stat. 1350, 1366 (2002). 
 142. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2082 (2015). 
 143. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (upholding the authority of the 
President to defy the Tenure of Office Act of 1867 and to remove an executive officer without 
consent of the Senate). 
 144. Conceptualizing the scope of the individual rights at issue in Zivotofsky is 
admittedly challenging and would affect how the Court weighs those rights. A sufficiently 
wider lens may have also considered the rights of classes of people beyond those in the same 
situation as little Menachem Zivotofsky—for example, people who wanted to visit Israel but 
might have been unable to do so if the Court had upheld the law and relations with Middle 
Eastern nations had deteriorated as a result of the Court’s decision. 
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III. SILENCES IN THE CONSTITUTION GENERALLY V. SILENCES IN THE 
CONSTITUTION’S RULES OF INTERPRETATION 
I begin this part of my paper by returning to one of the decisions I 
described briefly in the autobiographical introduction, explaining what first 
led me to use the “sounds of silence” as a frame through which to view the 
largest constitutional questions: Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme 
Court’s 1965 invalidation of a state law criminalizing the use of 
contraceptives by married couples.145 Nothing in the Constitution’s text 
could be invoked to explain fully why such a law could not withstand 
constitutional scrutiny. 
In an early draft of the Court’s opinion striking the law down, Justice 
Douglas sought to describe the conduct of a married couple to have 
unprotected sexual intercourse as an exercise of the First Amendment right 
“peaceably to assemble,” but Justice Black deftly responded that what he 
regularly did with his wife of many years didn’t seem to either of them to be 
an instance of peaceable assembly.146 
After abandoning that somewhat silly effort, Douglas settled on putting 
the entire Bill of Rights into a jurisprudential Cuisinart and emerged with a 
mélange that treated a “right of marital privacy” as a mix of various 
“penumbras” of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.147 
Although that Douglas effort was understandably derided by commentators 
as singularly undisciplined to the point of being opaque, if not altogether 
incoherent,148 a valid and indeed profound point lurked within the famed 
libertarian’s slapdash opinion. The point was that those disparate 
amendments were not just a sequence of unconnected limits on government 
authority over intimate personal choices. They were instead parts of a 
broader shield against totalitarian government, a shield whose shape could 
not be specified with precision at any given time but whose existence could 
not be denied or even denigrated simply because it wasn’t spelled out in 
detail anywhere in the Constitution’s text. 
Douglas included the Ninth Amendment along with the others that he 
poured into his verbal blender,149 not pausing to recognize that he was 
making a category error: the other amendments Douglas included each had a 
substantive ambit referring to a particular kind of individual decision, or a 
 
 145. 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965). 
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 149. 381 U.S. at 484. 
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procedural ambit dealing with a specific sort of governmental practice. 
Unlike the first eight amendments, the Ninth is a rule of construction, an 
overarching meta-principle directing the Federal Government and all its 
branches, including the Judiciary, never to regard the piecemeal and 
incomplete character of the enumerated substantive and procedural rights as 
preclusive of other rights, depending on the circumstances. That 
Amendment states: “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”150 
Griswold thus constituted an instance in which the Constitution’s own 
text did not in fact silently leave the Court free to choose between Douglas’s 
approach and that of the dissenting Justices, each of whom treated the 
Constitution’s silence on the existence of a right to intimate personal, sexual, 
or marital privacy—its failure to “enumerate” that right in the Bill of Rights 
or anywhere else in the Constitution—as though that silence represented a 
constitutional prohibition on the recognition of any such a right and on its 
federal judicial enforcement.151 Properly understood, the Ninth Amendment 
is a command, directed to all federal officials (including, of course, Supreme 
Court Justices), about how not to construe the rest of the Constitution’s text. 
Although Justice Goldberg, concurring separately, invoked the Ninth 
Amendment in just the right way (for the first time ever in any Justice’s 
opinion, whether for the Court or in a concurrence)152—a tribute, I think, to 
my friend and former Harvard colleague Stephen Breyer, the Justice who 
had been Goldberg’s law clerk at the time—the truth is that the Ninth 
Amendment’s meta-rule had never before been treated as a serious source of, 
or constraint on, constitutional doctrine. Indeed, although his having done 
so may in significant part help to explain Judge Robert Bork’s lopsided 
rejection by the Senate when President Reagan nominated him to the Court, 
Bork had casually dismissed the Ninth Amendment’s rule of construction as 
an incomprehensible and therefore judicially unenforceable “ink blot” 
during his confirmation hearings roughly two decades after Griswold, which 
he famously went out on a limb to denounce.153 
Whatever the most convincing explanation for Griswold v. Connecticut 
might be, that decades-old decision, now part of the firmly settled 
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constitutional canon, remains to this day the judicial foundation on which 
any number of more recent holdings rest—holdings that involve interests as 
disparate as the rights of women to decide, within certain limits, whether or 
not to continue their pregnancies to term (Roe v. Wade,154 Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,155 and Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt156); the rights of grandparents to choose which of their 
grandchildren to welcome into their homes (Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland157); the rights of consenting adults to engage in whatever forms of 
private sexual intimacy and coupling give them pleasure without imposing 
on any nonconsenting participant or observer (Lawrence v. Texas158); and 
the rights of same-sex couples to receive exactly the same official recognition 
as “married” as opposite-sex couples enjoy under the federal or state law 
(Obergefell v. Hodges159). 
In each of the leading cases establishing these rights notwithstanding the 
Constitution’s silence as to their existence, the Court was met with dissents 
that share a common objection. Reduced to their essentials, each of these 
dissents insisted that the failure of the constitutional text to give verbal 
expression to the right in question had to be treated as binding on federal 
courts unless and until the resulting silence was replaced with text adopted 
in accord with Article V’s process for formally amending the Constitution.160 
That those dissents have regularly, although to be sure not always, been 
rejected—sometimes in highly controversial rulings but usually in rulings 
that eventually met with broad public approval and invariably in rulings that 
have withstood the test of time—speaks volumes about the importance of 
not giving undue weight to constitutional gaps and omissions when 
interpreting that document—one intended, as the great Chief Justice John 
Marshall put it in 1819, to “endure for ages.”161 
Lamentably, the jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment is, to say the 
least, underdeveloped, if only because it remained unmentioned, and 
perhaps all but forgotten, until 1965. Another possible explanation for the 
relatively recent emergence of that amendment in the Court’s body of 
precedent is that, until Justice Goldberg’s concurring opinion in Griswold, 
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people appear to have assumed that the Ninth Amendment had to be mere 
window dressing lest it become a completely boundless source of newly 
invented and even fanciful rights. The more modest prospect of using the 
Ninth Amendment not as a shapeless and bottomless sea of potential new 
rights but solely as a rule of construction seems not to have occurred to 
anyone, at least not to any federal judge, before the mid-1960s. 
Perhaps the most convincing use of the Ninth Amendment is a relatively 
modest one. I have in mind situations in which the question presented 
involves a value or set of values almost but not quite covered by a 
constitutional provision or even by several such provisions. NASA v. Nelson, 
discussed previously, was a case of just that sort: however intrusive a 
government’s employment questionnaire and the accompanying 
background inquiries might be, the resulting invasion of what has come to 
be called “informational privacy” cannot quite be deemed a “search” or a 
“seizure” without stretching language past the breaking point.162 Thus it 
cannot come squarely within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment, at least as 
most of us read the text of that provision. Nor can it come squarely within 
the ambit of the First Amendment, although there are some Supreme Court 
precedents, mostly dating to the late 1950s and early 60s, in which probes 
into a person’s allegedly far-left (specifically, communist) political 
affiliations were held to violate the First Amendment.163 But the inquiries 
challenged in the NASA case were not even arguably ideological in character, 
and the right he asked the Court to recognize was not couched in terms that 
would have been limited to political inquiry. 
Yet the position taken by Justices Scalia and Thomas in that case was a 
radical one, viewed through the lens of the Ninth Amendment (which, sadly, 
the majority did not invoke when rejecting the Scalia/Thomas position as 
unreasonably constraining). Their position was that, because a right of 
informational privacy is not covered by—that is, enumerated in—the Fourth 
Amendment, it follows that it cannot be found within what might be called 
the gravitational field of that amendment,164 perhaps influenced as well by 
the gravitational field of the First Amendment.165 That cramped 
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interpretation looks like as pure an instance of violating the Ninth 
Amendment’s rule of construction as can be imagined.166 
Another such instance came before the Supreme Court in 1980, in 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.167 That case, which I argued at the 
Court against the Commonwealth of Virginia, held that only extraordinary 
circumstances could ever justify excluding the press and the public from 
courtrooms trying a criminal case just because neither the trial court, nor the 
prosecution, nor the defendant (who could not invoke an accused’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial in order to exclude the public) wants the 
proceedings to be open for public observation.168 
It was my view at the time that the First Amendment’s freedoms of 
speech and press, which media lawyers thought sufficient to justify the result 
we sought in Richmond Newspapers, could not in themselves comfortably 
support a presumptive right of public observation of proceedings like those 
in that case. The reason was that none of the participants in the trial in 
question was a “willing speaker.”169 All relevant actors opted to keep the 
proceedings out of public view, much as an author who chooses not to share 
her diary with anyone opts to keep that diary to herself—and does so 
without triggering anyone’s First Amendment right to be free of government 
interference to prevent a willing speaker from communicating with a willing 
listener. But the “freedom of speech” and “of the press,” while plausibly 
encompassing freedoms to hear and observe and to report, presuppose that 
the source of what one wants to hear or observe wishes to communicate that 
information. As others have observed, the First Amendment is not a 
Freedom of Information Act.170 
For that reason, I thought it essential to invoke not just the First 
Amendment but also the Ninth, identifying its purpose as that of preventing 
anyone from “construing” the silence of the Constitution’s text as to the 
existence of a contested right as a decisive negation of that right.171 I thought 
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that argument was particularly essential when, as in Richmond Newspapers, 
the contested right protects values close to the heart of rights that the 
Constitution does in fact enumerate. And, to my delight (and to the 
consternation of those on my side of the case who sought mightily to prevent 
me from so much as mentioning the all-but-forgotten Ninth Amendment, 
which they viewed as radioactive), the plurality opinion by Chief Justice 
Burger upheld our contention that the Constitution presumptively 
precluded closing the proceedings to the press and public, and centrally 
invoked the Ninth Amendment, focusing on the reasons for James 
Madison’s decision to include it in the Bill of Rights.172 
As our brief had detailed and the plurality opinion explained, Madison’s 
principal reason for including that rule of construction in the Bill was to 
mollify those who feared that, just as a Constitution without any listing of 
specific rights might be invoked (despite the Tenth Amendment) to enable 
the Federal Government to run roughshod over the rights enumerated, so 
too a Constitution that listed certain rights might be taken by future 
generations to imply that the list was exhaustive and that no rights other 
than those enumerated were entitled to federal constitutional recognition.173 
To prevent the Bill of Rights from exerting that kind of “repulsive 
gravitational force”—to prevent it from becoming a kind of “dark energy”—
the Ninth Amendment was included as one of the Bill’s two final provisions. 
The other such provision was the Tenth Amendment, a rule of 
construction that is, in a sense, the mirror image of the rule embodied in the 
Ninth. It directs that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, 
respectively, or to the people.”174 As with the Ninth Amendment, my courses 
in constitutional law over the years have addressed the degree to which that 
rule about “powers not delegated”—again, a textually expressed rule about 
matters not expressed in the text—either has or should have played a role in 
the way structural principles of federal-state relations, relations sometimes 
described under the rubric of “vertical federalism,” have evolved over time, 
with the arc of unenumerated federal powers largely ascendant in the early 
nineteenth century, turning downward from the late nineteenth until 
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roughly 1937,175 then ascendant again until the 1990s,176 and on a mostly 
downward trajectory in the years since.177 
Without any change in the Constitution’s text, the dominant judicial 
approach to the Constitution’s silences with respect to both rights and 
powers has undergone enormous transformation through the medium of the 
legal culture, reflected and implemented by the federal judiciary, exercising a 
power of judicial review that we must recall is itself nowhere enumerated in 
the Constitution—a vast power extracted from a conspicuous silence. 
Noteworthy is the fact that such textual rules about how gaps, absences, 
or silences are to be understood are themselves surrounded by silences: Are 
the Ninth and Tenth Amendment’s rules about those gaps, absences, or 
silences to be enforced by the federal judiciary, or are they merely reminders 
of postulates entrusted to the political branches or to state courts, not 
enforceable by federal judges? 
Disputes over such choices are unending in our law. And, perhaps, 
necessarily so because the tower of rules and meta-rules and meta-meta rules 
is inevitably unending. The great philosopher Bertrand Russell is said to 
have asked a woman who told him the Earth rested on the back of a huge 
turtle, “What holds up the turtle?”—trying to lead her into a logical dead-
end. Quickly besting the brilliant logician, she instantly replied: “It’s no use, 
Professor. . . . It’s turtles all the way down.”178  
IV. SILENCES IN THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF V. SILENCES IN WHAT IS SAID 
ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION 
As we saw in connection with NASA v. Nelson, the majority’s 
determination not to say whether the Constitution contains a generalized 
right of “informational privacy” infuriated two of the Justices, who thought it 
obvious both that no such right could possibly exist and that the Court was 
wrong not to come right out and say so. Any such right, they insisted, would 
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have to be “invent[ed] right out of whole cloth.”179 No less vehemently, those 
justices accused the majority of needlessly teasing the legal profession and 
the American public: “Thirty-three years have passed since the Court first 
suggested that the right may, or may not, exist. It is past time for the Court 
to abandon this Alfred Hitchcock line of our jurisprudence.”180 
Notwithstanding the protest by Justices Scalia and Thomas, both of 
them are among the jurists who have frequently said that the Court should 
avoid constitutional pronouncements when not necessary to the resolution 
of a concrete case or controversy. Indeed, as every student of the Court’s 
body of decisions knows well, the vast bulk of what the Court does involves 
deciding what not to decide, both about the Constitution and about other 
matters of federal law. Of the seven to eight thousand petitions asking the 
Court each year to weigh in on such matters, only six or seven dozen are 
selected by the Court in granting writs of certiorari to review the questions 
presented.181 When the Court denies review, as it nearly always does, it is 
expressing no view either way on whether the decision it has left untouched 
was right or wrong, and it is only once in a blue moon that any Justice either 
concurs to explain his or her agreement with the denial of cert or dissents to 
protest that the case should have been set down for full briefing and 
argument on the merits. 
Much could be said, and more than enough has already been written, 
about the factors that enter into decisions about whether to grant cert, and I 
won’t be adding to that voluminous literature here. Rather, I will focus—and 
then, only briefly—on a narrower set of issues, those presented when the 
Court is not just leaving a case totally unreviewed but is undertaking to 
review it and is then considering whether to dodge some substantive 
constitutional question that the case might squarely present or might at least 
reasonably be thought to present. That is the issue of “constitutional 
avoidance,” which some see as a problem182 and others study as a doctrine.183 
The Court first articulated constitutional avoidance as a matter of doctrine 
in 1936, in a famous concurring opinion by Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. 
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Tennessee Valley Authority.184 Refusing to address the claim that the entire 
TVA Act—a federal statute designed to promote rural electrification as part 
of FDR’s “first” New Deal—was unconstitutional, Justice Brandeis 
memorably articulated a set of considerations that he said ought to lead 
federal courts to avoid deciding difficult constitutional questions that might 
dispose of a case when it would be possible to decide the case on narrower 
grounds—grounds leaving those difficult questions unanswered at least for 
the time being.185 
There are more than a few occasions when the Court has all but tortured 
the words of a federal statute in order to avoid resolving a particularly 
perplexing constitutional issue. One particularly egregious example involved 
Bond v. United States, a 2014 Supreme Court decision stemming from a U.S. 
Attorney’s seemingly bizarre and at the very least unwise decision to charge 
a woman with violating the law Congress had enacted to implement the 
Chemical Weapons Convention even though all the distraught woman did 
was conspicuously spread toxic substances on the car, mailbox, and door 
knob of a rival for her husband’s affection in the hope that her rival would 
develop an uncomfortable rash.186 Although the terms of the law literally 
covered what the woman had done, the Court, in an opinion written by 
Chief Justice Roberts, managed to cobble together six Justices to hold that, 
because of uncertainty about whether Congress really meant what it said as 
applied to circumstances like those presented in that case, respect for “basic 
principles of federalism” supported holding that the accused woman’s “local 
criminal activity” could not be punished under the Act to Implement the 
International Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.187 The 
Court’s majority wrote that, just as it would have had a duty to interpret an 
ambiguous federal law so as to avoid difficult constitutional questions about 
the reach of the treaty power and of Congress’s power to implement a duly 
ratified treaty, so too it had a duty to find some way to hold even an 
unambiguous federal law inapplicable if holding it applicable in accord with 
its manifestly applicable terms would have made such avoidance 
impossible.188 
 
 184. 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“The Court developed, for its 
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Unsurprisingly, the four dissenters, led by Justice Scalia, made 
mincemeat of that reasoning: “Somewhere in Norristown, Pennsylvania, a 
husband’s paramour suffered a minor thumb burn at the hands of a betrayed 
wife. The United States Congress—‘every where extending the sphere of its 
activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex’—has made a 
federal case out of it. What are we to do?”189 His answer was straightforward: 
“As sweeping and unsettling as the Chemical Weapons Convention 
Implementation Act of 1998 may be, it is clear beyond doubt that it covers 
what Bond did; and we have no authority to amend it. So we are forced to 
decide—there is no way around it—whether the Act’s application to what 
Bond did was constitutional.”190 Scalia would have held that it was not, and 
he forcefully accused the Court of exceeding its authority by contriving not 
to do so.191 (Oh how I miss the late Justice Scalia’s clarity—much as I often 
disagreed with him.) 
Many, and one hopes most, instances of constitutional avoidance are far 
easier to justify than that presented in Bond. Federal laws are often written in 
genuinely ambiguous ways that can be construed narrowly enough to spare 
those laws from facial invalidation (and, at the same time, sufficiently 
narrowly to avoid effectively accusing Members of Congress of having 
violated their oath to uphold the Constitution). When laws are drafted with 
sufficient facial ambiguity, that kind of narrowing construction can be 
performed without twisting statutory words beyond recognition or, even 
worse, leaving those words standing but stubbornly refusing to apply them 
in particular circumstances where federal enforcement authorities foolishly 
failed to exercise their discretion not to prosecute. 
The Court decides a number of clearly defensible constitutional 
avoidance cases on a regular basis. Those that are most controversial involve 
raising barriers to individuals and businesses seeking to bring federal 
constitutional challenges before Article III courts, barriers either very 
narrowly defining the class of those with “standing” to invoke federal judicial 
power or treating certain matters, such as the constitutionality of actions by 
the Commander in Chief in pursuing undeclared wars, as posing 
nonjusticiable political questions and thereby leaving individual victims 
without any possibility of obtaining judicial redress.192 
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There is a veritable cottage industry of books and articles about the so-
called passive virtues of abstaining from decision, as well as counter-books 
and articles delineating the “subtle vices of the passive virtues.”193 This paper 
isn’t a useful place to sum up that literature or to build on it, but it is worth 
noting at least one particular form of “constitutional avoidance” that entails 
the very opposite of remaining silent about what is in the Constitution. That 
form of avoidance turns out to be more frequently invoked than one might 
suppose. 
The most consequential example in recent years was the approach taken 
by Chief Justice Roberts to provide a fifth vote to reject a sweeping 
constitutional attack on President Obama’s most significant domestic 
achievement, the passage of the Affordable Care Act. In NFIB v. Sebelius, 
decided in 2012, the Chief joined four Justices in concluding that Congress 
had exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause in undertaking to require virtually all businesses and citizens 
to purchase federally approved health insurance194—but he joined another 
four justices in concluding that Congress acted within the taxing power in 
imposing federal tax penalties on those who failed to purchase such 
insurance in accord with the ACA.195 Congress had, as far as the naked eye 
could see, done more than impose taxes on non-purchasers: it had in essence 
purported to make non-purchasers into outlaws.196 But the Chief Justice, 
alone among the Justices in that respect, asserted the authority in essence to 
rewrite the ACA, abetted by the administration’s promise, offered obligingly 
during oral argument,197 to refrain from criminally prosecuting any non-
purchasers, so that the ACA could masquerade (at least for the duration of 
the Obama administration) as a mere tax, which the Chief Justice insisted—
with a clear if not altogether convincing explanation—was a less drastic and 
invasive form of power than a free-standing regulation.198 
I don’t mean to be as critical of the chief as this may sound. On the 
contrary, in the 2014 book I coauthored with Joshua Matz, Uncertain Justice, 
I defend the Chief’s unusual way of sustaining the heart of the ACA,199 
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following a path I had publicly predicted he would take (and had argued he 
should take) months before the decision was announced.200 
What I do mean to be saying is simply that, although presented as an 
instance of constitutional avoidance, the Roberts opinion didn’t actually 
avoid any constitutional question but instead resolved it against what 
Congress quite plainly wrote. The Chief Justice conceded that “reading” the 
congressional mandate to purchase insurance as though it offered 
individuals and employers the option of either purchasing insurance or 
paying a federal tax penalty for not doing so required rejecting by far the 
most natural reading of the ACA and replacing it with a version of the law 
that Congress had not actually crafted. But he said that he had to adopt that 
reading in order to avoid the more drastic step of striking down the ACA 
altogether. Thus the Chief Justice essentially rewrote Congress’s handiwork 
so as to avoid the politically unpalatable and institutionally injurious result 
of dooming the entire ACA. In doing so, he was taking two significant and 
controversial steps. 
One was a step that four dissenting Justices criticized as a usurpation of 
Congress’s exclusive power to raise and collect taxes under Article I201—while 
four concurring Justices defended it as entirely legitimate inasmuch as it did 
not entail subjecting anyone to a tax liability that Congress had not in fact 
authorized, albeit under a regulatory rubric.202 
The other was a step that the four dissenters praised as a proper 
application of prior Commerce Clause jurisprudence203—while the four 
concurring Justices attacked it as unprecedented and unjustifiable.204 To 
those four, the Chief had imposed a substantial and analytically incoherent 
new constraint on Congress’s Article I power to regulate interstate 
commerce when he insisted that Congress had exceeded its power to regulate 
commercial activity when it sought to create such activity by compelling 
supposedly “inactive” individuals to enter the stream of commerce.205 It was 
an instance of using faux-avoidance not as a genuinely interpretive 
technique but, rather, as a more modest remedy for a constitutional violation 
than out-and-out rejection of Congress’s entire enactment would have 
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been.206 But what seemed more modest vis-à-vis the ACA was anything but 
modest vis-à-vis the Constitution.207 
That observation leads to a final note: whenever the Supreme Court 
either issues a formal constitutional condemnation (even if in the course of 
upholding an exercise of power on other grounds, as in NFIB) or gives its 
formal constitutional blessing to a contested exercise of state or federal 
power, evaluating the long-term impact of what the Court has done requires 
a comparison with the impact of what would have happened had the Court 
simply refrained from speaking to the constitutional question at hand. The 
evaluation requires, to be clear, a comparison with the impact of silence. 
Perhaps the best example of what I have in mind is Korematsu v. United 
States, the infamous—indeed, anticanonical—case in which the Court in 
1944 deferred to government assertions that the forced relocation of 
Japanese Americans (all United States citizens of Japanese ancestry living 
along major stretches of the West Coast) was essential to America’s national 
security.208 Among the many reasons Korematsu was a blot on the Court’s 
and the nation’s history was that the Court displayed uncritical faith in 
factual claims by government lawyers about the threat posed by persons 
described as Japanese-American spies and saboteurs even though these 
claims directly contradicted confidential reports by high-level military and 
intelligence officials that, as it turns out, the Justice Department had 
deliberately misrepresented to the Supreme Court—an inexcusable lapse for 
which the Solicitor General formally apologized decades later.209 
The Court stopped short of ever actually upholding the internment—in 
“so-called Relocation Centers,” which dissenting Justice Owen Roberts 
rightly said was but “a euphemism for concentration camps”210—of loyal 
Americans of Japanese descent, purportedly upholding “only” the orders 
imposing a curfew on those Americans and requiring them to leave their 
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homes and the areas in which they had lived for years to report to designated 
“Assembly Centers.”211 Indeed, in a much-overlooked decision issued the 
same day as Korematsu, in a case called Ex parte Endo, the Court ruled in an 
opinion by Justice Douglas that the forcible internment of U.S. citizens 
merely by virtue of their Japanese ancestry was not in fact authorized by 
federal law.212 The Court thus avoided having to decide whether, if federally 
authorized, such race-based internment would, under the circumstances 
existing at the time, comport with the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.213 
The Court’s Korematsu opinion contained a slim silver lining: it voiced 
the first dictum in our constitutional history stating that the principles of 
“equal protection of the laws” applicable to racial discrimination by state 
authorities under the Fourteenth Amendment, enacted in 1868, apply as well 
to racial discrimination (and presumably to other forms of discrimination as 
well) by federal authorities under the Fifth Amendment, enacted in 1791—
despite the Fifth Amendment’s self-conscious silence as to any equality 
principle and the obvious incompatibility of its history with that principle, at 
least with respect to the paradigm case of race. Specifically, the Court in 
Korematsu said that “all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a 
single racial group are immediately suspect” and must be “subject[ed] to the 
most rigid scrutiny” to assure that they are in fact justified by “[p]ressing 
public necessity” and do not reflect “racial antagonism.”214 But the Court 
then shamefully proceeded to find the requisite justification by deferring 
uncritically to the merely asserted judgment of the President and of military 
authorities in the perilous circumstances confronting our nation in the wake 
of Japan’s attack on our naval forces at Pearl Harbor. 
One of the three dissenters, Justice Robert Jackson, issued a passionate 
condemnation not just of the Court’s finding but, more fundamentally, of 
the Court’s decision not to remain silent: 
It would be impracticable and dangerous idealism to expect or insist that 
each specific military command in an area of probable operations will 
conform to conventional tests of constitutionality. When an area is so beset 
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that it must be put under military control at all, the paramount 
consideration is that its measures be successful, rather than legal. The 
armed services must protect a society, not merely its Constitution. . . . No 
court can require such a commander in such circumstances to act as a 
reasonable man; he may be unreasonably cautious and exacting. Perhaps he 
should be. But a commander, in temporarily focusing the life of a 
community on defense, is carrying out a military program; he is not 
making law in the sense the courts know the term. He issues orders, and 
they may have a certain authority as military commands, although they 
may be very bad as constitutional law. 
But if we cannot confine military expedients by the Constitution, neither 
would I distort the Constitution to approve all that the military may deem 
expedient. That is what the Court appears to be doing, whether consciously 
or not. I cannot say, from any evidence before me, that the orders of 
General DeWitt were not reasonably expedient military precautions, nor 
could I say that they were. But even if they were permissible military 
procedures, I deny that it follows that they are constitutional. If, as the 
Court holds, it does follow, then we may as well say that any military order 
will be constitutional, and have done with it. . . . 
Much is said of the danger to liberty from the Army program for deporting 
and detaining these citizens of Japanese extraction. But a judicial 
construction of the due process clause that will sustain this order is a far 
more subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation of the order itself. A 
military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the 
military emergency. Even during that period a succeeding commander may 
revoke it all. But once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show 
that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution 
to show that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time 
has validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure 
and of transplanting American citizens. The principle then lies about like a 
loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a 
plausible claim of an urgent need. Every repetition imbeds that principle 
more deeply in our law and thinking and expands it to new purposes. All 
who observe the work of courts are familiar with what Judge Cardozo 
described as “the tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its 
logic.” A military commander may overstep the bounds of 
constitutionality, and it is an incident. But if we review and approve, that 
passing incident becomes the doctrine of the Constitution. There it has a 
generative power of its own, and all that it creates will be in its own 
image.215 
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It is by no means clear what Jackson would have had the Court do with the 
conviction of Fred Korematsu, “born on our soil, of parents born in Japan,” 
for “merely . . . being present in the state whereof he is a citizen, near the 
place where he was born, and where all his life he has lived,” in violation of a 
“series of military orders which made [his] conduct a crime” by forbidding 
him to remain—and at the same time forbidding him to leave.216 This surreal 
and untenable Catch 22 required him, if he wished to avoid violation, “to 
give himself up to the military authority” to submit to “custody, 
examination, and transportation out of the territory, to be followed by 
indeterminate confinement in detention camps.”217 
Would Jackson have let Korematsu’s conviction stand without any 
judicial review at all? Could he have held that the conviction should have 
been reviewed but somehow upheld that same conviction while not 
addressing in any way the constitutionality of the orders he had been 
convicted of violating? 
My purpose here is not to explore the intricacies of the extraordinary 
sort of “judicial silence” that Justice Jackson seemed to favor in the singular 
circumstances of Fred Korematsu’s case. My only purpose is to illustrate, in 
the dramatic form the subject demands, the importance of evaluating every 
instance of a pronouncement about what the Constitution says—or what it 
fails to say—against the background alternative of somehow contriving to 
remain silent. 
* * * 
Silences, whether in the Constitution itself or in authoritative judicial 
pronouncements about what the Constitution requires, allows, or forbids, 
cannot be meaningfully evaluated without comparing them to the array of 
alternatives—comparing them to the background of soundings that those 
silences interrupt or replace. The question is always: silence . . . compared to 
what? 
The reciprocal relationship between soundings and silences, the topic of 
this paper, is ultimately shrouded in mystery. That brings me to my final 
observation: few fortune cookies reveal messages worth saving. A possible 
exception turned up in a cookie a friend was served at a popular Chinese 
restaurant in Cambridge: “Everything that we see is a shadow cast by that 
which we do not see.”218 
 
 216. Id. at 242–43. 
 217. Id. at 243. 
 218. For several years, I had simply assumed that the author of this haunting image 
would remain hidden from view, laboring away in some obscure fortune cookie factory. But 
my resourceful research assistant Colin Doyle, a 3L at Harvard Law School—finding that 
scenario as unlikely as it was romantic—pursued the matter assiduously and recently informed 
66 Michigan Law Review Online [Vol. 115:26 
 
 
I would add only: “Everything that we do not see is a shadow cast by that 
which we might have seen.” 
 
 
me that the source of the message in question was none other than an early sermon by Dr. 
Martin Luther King Jr., reprinted in his 1958 book, The Measure of a Man. MARTIN LUTHER 
KING, JR., THE MEASURE OF A MAN 32 (1959). 
